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I. Introduction
On December 15, 1993, the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations was concluded successfully after seven years of difficult
negotiations. The Final Act1 creates a World Trade Organization
(WTO) and comprehensively addresses a wide variety of policy issues
affecting international trade. One topic left unaddressed, however, is
the increasingly important relationship between international trade
and antitrust goals and policies. In a bygone age when the United
States economy was largely autonomous, government-enforced compe-
tition policy followed the dictates of the antitrust laws, chiefly the Sher-
man Act,2 the Clayton Act,3 the Federal Trade Commission Act, 4 and
the Robinson-Patman Act,5 all enacted during populist periods of
American history in which there was widespread abuse of monopoly
power and distrust of "big" business. These antitrust laws are enforced
by two federal agencies: the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Department of Justice. The result of their enforcement, consistent
with their underlying jurisprudence, is an important national policy:
the promotion of competition in order to ensure consumer welfare
and allocative efficiency. 6
During the past two decades, however, these traditional antitrust
goals have been overshadowed by other concerns. First, the antitrust
1 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, broadly prohib-
its contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. A non-exclusive list in-
cludes price fixing, concerted refusals to deal, and tying arrangements. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, proscribes monopolization and the attempt to monopolize
trade.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (1988). Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, provides
enforcement against incipient monopolization.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57c (1988). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C § 45, prohibits "unfair methods of competition," including conduct that threatens to
ripen into an antitrust violation.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21 (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimi-
nation in certain circumstances. 1d.
6 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966); ROBERT H. BOPRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 98-133
(1978). In his extensive analysis, Bork concludes that the antitrust laws protect consumer
welfare through concern with allocative efficiency by ensuring that resources are put to their
best use; he finds no place for considering distributive issues in antitrust. Robert H. Lande
has argued, however, that the original concern of the antitrust laws was with distributive
issues-the transfer of wealth from consumers to large firms exercising monopoly power.
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65, 67 (1982). See also Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals
of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191
(1977); Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
1076 (1979).
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theories of the "Chicago School"7 dominate both the courts and en-
forcement authorities.8 These theories focus on encouraging business
firms to achieve increased output and efficiency by providing a greater
tolerance than that allowed by traditional theories for vertical re-
straints and horizontal combinations. 9 Second, the international trade
laws-in marked contrast to the antitrust laws-have been enforced
with increasing zeal. The international trade laws introduce a new
competition policy that emphasizes the ability of United States busi-
ness to compete with foreign-based firms. Thus, U.S. industries are not
only protected at home against unfair or even merely onerous foreign
competition; they also are assisted in opening new export markets, par-
ticularly in countries with "unfair" trade policies and closed markets.
In recent years, this protectionist competition policy has steadily
gained ground. The popular press has taken up the cause by attribut-
ing layoffs and recession to low-wage (and some high-wage) foreign
competition and closed foreign markets. Devotees of the "new com-
petitiveness" call for governmental remedies: stricter trade laws, relax-
ation of traditional antitrust standards, and "managed trade."
However laudable the goal of increasing the international compet-
itiveness of U.S. industry, it is apparent that pursuit of this goal some-
times engenders conflicts with traditional antitrust policies.
Analytically, there are four problem areas with respect to the interrela-
tionship between the international trade laws and antitrust: (1) Are
there inherent conflicts between the policies of the international trade
laws and antitrust? If so, how can these conflicts be resolved? (2) Are
the antitrust laws an impediment to the international competitiveness
of U.S. industries and companies? Should they be weakened? (3) Is
there reason to harmonize national antitrust laws and enforcement?
(4) Should the antitrust laws be enlisted as a tool to open foreign mar-
kets and increase the international competitiveness of U.S. industry?
These four issues will be addressed in turn. The concluding sec-
tion will propose a framework for reconciling trade and antitrust policy
and offer support for an international competition code within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 10
7 For a discussion of the conservative-oriented Chicago School and its principal rivals,
see Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REv. 917 (1987), and Eleanor
M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming
From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936 (1987).
8 See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
9 See generally Fox, supra note 7.
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
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H. Policy Conflicts Between Antitrust and International Trade
Laws
A. The Different Policy Goals
Competition laws, e.g., the antitrust laws, and international trade
laws have different policy goals. The purpose of competition policy is
to ensure the functioning of the free market and to protect consumers
against market-distorting restraints and practices. Industries and firms
are thus compelled to compete for the consumer's favor, which en-
sures the availability of the best choice of goods and services at opti-
mum prices. 1
In contrast, the international trade laws are aimed at securing the
competitive position of U.S. industries, firms, and workers in both do-
mestic and international commerce. Some of the international trade
laws protect against not only unfair import competition, but also fairly
traded imports that may cause serious injury. Other international
trade laws seek to foster an open world trading system, i.e., a world
open to U.S. exports and investment.12 It is not surprising that the
widely different purposes of the international trade laws and the anti-
trust laws sometimes come into conflict.
B. The Trade Relief Laws
1. The Antidumping Laws
Dumping occurs when a firm is found to sell its product at a lower
price in an export market than in its home market. Under current law
such price discrimination is virtually illegal per se. There are two an-
tidumping statutes under U.S. law. The Antidumping Act of 191613
creates a private right of action against dumping that occurs with the
intent of destroying or injuring American industry or restraining or
monopolizing trade or commerce in the United States. Because of the
difficulty of proving this requirement, this Act is moribund. 14
I See, for example, the classic statement of the United States Supreme Court in North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958):
[T] he Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
prices will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress ....
12 See generally Symposium, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law & Policy, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 397 (1987).
13 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
14 For discussion on this point, see Kermit W. Almstedt, International Price Discrimination
in the 1916 Dumping Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1981).
Representative Richard Gephardt and others in Congress have proposed to amend the 1916
Act to create a rebuttable presumption that foreign firms which are subject to antidumping
findings have acted with the intent of destroying or injuring a U.S. industry. These proposals
have failed to pass. See Gilbert B. Kaplan & Susan H. Kuhbach, The Causes of Unfair Trade:
Trade Law Enforcers' Perspective, 56 ANTIrrRST LJ. 445 (1987).
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The second antidumping law, first passed in 1921 and reenacted
in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,15 is very much alive. This law,
which is administered jointly by the Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission (ITC), permits a finding of dumping
to be based upon sales of foreign merchandise in the United States at
"less than fair value" if these sales are causing or threatening to cause
"material injury" to the U.S. industry producing a "like product.' 6
The first prong of this test-sales at less than fair value (LTFV)-
is essentially a price discrimination determination: An LTFV sale exists
if the home market price exceeds the U.S. price.1 7 The second re-
15 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
§ 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1677k (1988)), essentially replaced
the Antidumping Act of 1921, amending Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Trade
Agreement Act was passed to bring the U.S. antidumping law into conformity with the GATT
requirements of the Tokyo Round; however, the changes in the law were primarily
procedural.
16 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). As an alternative to showing material injury or the threat of
material injury, the injury requirement of dumping can be satisfied by showing that the estab-
lishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of imports. 19
U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B) (1988).
17 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1) (A) (1988). The test for dumping focuses upon price differ-
ences or discrimination between different markets. In effect, it is unfair to charge different
prices for the same goods. However, unlike the domestic U.S. price discrimination statute,
the Robinson-Patman Act, which compares differences in actual selling prices to different
customers in the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), the dumping price discrimination focuses
on comparing the ex factory netback prices in the two markets. Therefore, the prices in each
market must be adjusted by accounting for container, packaging, and transport costs, import
duties, taxes, and a variety of other costs that may be different in each market. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(d)-(e) (1988); International Trade Administration Antidumping Duties, 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.41-.42 (1992). In a dumping case, the U.S. Department of Commerce will investigate
whether there have been sales at "less than fair value" by comparing the "U.S. price" with
"fair value." Fair value or "foreign market value" is calculated based on a weighted average of
home market prices, while the U.S. price is determined on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (1988). Under current law, however, the methodology of calculating
fair value is skewed so as to enhance the possibility of a finding of dumping. These method-
ological defects in the process are as follows:
First, when there is an absence of adequate verifiable sales in the home market or where
home market sales are below cost for an extended period of time, the Commerce Depart-
ment bases foreign market value (fair value) on either the price at which the merchandise is
sold or offered for sale to third countries or on the "constructed value" of the merchandise.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1) (B),(a)(2) (1988). Both result in highly arbitrary measures. Picking
a third country as a surrogate obviously presents difficulty. The criteria used are similarity of
product to that exported to the United States, value of sales, and similarity of market in terms
of organization and development of that with the United States. 19 C.F.R. § 353.49(b)
(1993). "Constructed value" also is highly artificial. Constructed value consists of direct ex-
penses plus general expenses (overhead), which must be at least ten percent direct expenses;
and a profit equal to not less than eight percent of the sum of direct and general expenses as
well as the cost of packing. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (1988). There is a presumptive rule of
eighteen percent for general expenses and profit, which tends to raise the fair value price to
increase the likelihood of a finding of dumping as well as increase the resulting dumping
margin.
Second, where more than ten percent of total sales in the home market are below cost
sales (based on fully allocated costs), the Commerce Department will disregard the below
cost sales in calculating fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1988); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.51 (1993).
The effect of excluding low cost sales is to increase fair value, thus enhancing the possibility
of a finding of dumping as well as the dumping margin.
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quirement, "material injury," is defined as "harm which is not inconse-
quential, immaterial, or unimportant."18 For the purpose of making
this finding, the ITC, which is given this task, can consider a wide
range of factors such as "actual and potential decline in output, sales,
market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and utiliza-
tion of capacity," "factors affecting domestic prices," "actual and poten-
tial negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to reuse capital, and investment," and "actual and po-
tential negative effects on the existing development and production
efforts of the domestic industry."1 9 The causation requirement is not a
rigorous one; the injury can be caused "by reason of" the imports if
they "contribut[e] to the [the] overall injury to [a domestic] industry."20
Viewed from the perspective of economics and antitrust analysis,
the antidumping laws have numerous shortcomings. While the anti-
trust laws focus on injury to competition, the antidumping acts focus
on injury to U.S. producers. It is not often the case that injuring U.S.
producers injures competition.
First, if the antidumping laws were aimed at predatory price dis-
crimination, i.e., selling below a reasonable measure of cost to drive
out competitors and to achieve market control, then the antitrust laws
would join in condemnation. Both the Robinson-Patman Act and sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act outlaw predatory pricing;2 1 however, except
for the virtually irrelevant 1916 Antidumping Act,2 2 a finding of dump-
Third, Department of Commerce regulations limit circumstances of sale adjustments in
calculating fair value to that amount claimed on U.S. sales. 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b) (1993).
This arbitrary cap tends to increase the home market ex factory price thereby increasing the
likelihood of dumping and the dumping margin.
Fourth, in determining the existence of dumping or the dumping margin, the Depart-
ment of Commerce compares a weighted average of home market or third country prices
with the U.S. price on a transaction-by-transaction basis. In making this comparison, the
department ignores !"negative margins," i.e., instances in which the U.S. price exceeds foreign
market value. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 b(c) (1988).
18 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (A) (1988).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)-(C) (1988).
20 The legislative history makes clear that the causation requirement is not defining a
principal, substantial, or even significant cause, but only a contributory cause. S. Rep. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 443.
21 Section 2 of the Sherman Act penalizes "every person who shall monopolize or at-
tempt to monopolize." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). In attempted monopolization cases, a creditor's
below cost pricing is illegal. Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); Thur-
man Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1989). In monopolization
cases, below cost pricing is generally conclusive of predatory pricing. United States v. Prin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, also reaches predatory pricing: A plaintiff may challenge predatory pricing
under the Robinson-Patman Act by showing that one of the two prices charged in a price
discrimination case was below cost. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). Most predatory pricing cases have
been brought under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. and
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, (2d Cir. 1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.
1981); William Inglis and Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1981); Chillicothe Sand and Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1980).
22 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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ing is independent of any showing of predatory intent.23 It may be
further objected that the showing of a specific predatory intent is too
high a standard of proof (witness the moribund nature of the 1916
Act), and the current antidumping regime is necessary to nip such po-
tential conduct in the bud. However, if this is the purpose of the an-
tidumping statute, it is terribly over-inclusive. Dumping can be found
solely on the basis of price discrimination, even if both prices are
above average total cost.24 In contrast, under the competition laws,
prices above average total cost are legal per se, and a manufacturer's
prices are not suspect of being predatory unless they are below the
company's average variable or marginal costs. 25 Furthermore, the an-
tidumping laws are devoid of the standard Robinson-Patman Act de-
fenses to price discrimination: "acting in good faith to meet an equally
lower price of a competitor"26 and selling under "changing conditions
affecting the market or marketability of the goods concerned." 27
Second, the key concept of "material injury" to U.S. producers is
vague and imprecise. The definition of injury as "harm which is not
23 For example, compare the statutory language of the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1988), with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
24 In a dumping case the inquiry is whether a foreign producer is selling at less than fair
value. Sales at "less than fair value" exist when a price differential can be found between the
foreign producer's home market and the U.S. market; when a price differential exists be-
tween the foreign producer's prices and third country markets and the U.S. market; or when
sales in the United States occur below a constructed cost of production. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a) (1)-(2) (1988). Even in the third case where the foreign producer's costs are an
issue in a dumping case, the inquiry is whether the sales are below fully allocated costs, i.e.,
total cost or average total cost calculated as the sum of fixed and variable costs divided by the
number of units produced.
25 See Henry v. Chloride Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1346 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Prices above average
total cost are legal per se ... average variable cost is a marker of rebuttable presumptions,
with the plaintiff holding the burden above and the defendant below."); see generally Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 I-Av. L. REV. 697 (1975); Daniel J. Gifford, Rethinking the Relationship Between An-
tidumping and Antitrust Laws, 6 Am. U.J. IrNr'L L. & PoL'Y 277 (1991).
26 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988). Therefore, a foreign company accused of dumping in the
United States market cannot defend on the basis that its low prices were necessary to meet
the competition. See 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Components from Japan, USITC
Pub. 1862, at 1718, Inv. No. 731-TA-270 (Apr. 1986) (final admin. review) (finding material
injury in a dumping case although the price cutting was initiated by the U.S. producer).
27 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). This defense permits sales at bargain prices to remove obsolete
inventory and to respond to changing market conditions. See, e.g., Valley Plymouth v. Stude-
baker-Packard Corp., 219 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Cal. 1953). The foreign producer in a dumping
case, therefore, cannot defend its price cutting on the basis of response to changing condi-
tions. This highlights the most significant difference between the Robinson-Patman Act and
the antidumping provisions: In a Robinson-Patman Act case the fundamental inquiry is
whether the producer charged the same price to customers at the same time. See A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1407 (7th Cir. 1989) ("No one supposes
that a seller must charge the same price on contracts signed at different times, or on long-
term contracts and spot sales."). A dumping case is fundamentally different: Ex factory
prices on individual U.S. transactions are typically compared to a six-month weighted average
of the ex factory prices in home market or third-country sales. This contravenes the Robin-
son-Patman Act rule that a seller may charge different prices even to the same customer at
different times.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 19
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant" and the fact that im-
ports need be only a contributory cause of the harm mean that the
necessary proof is not rigorous. In practice, material injury determina-
tions are made on the basis of declining production figures, employ-
ment, and profits, while causation is shown by evidence of under
selling and lost sales.28 Antitrust analysis would be much more rigor-
ous than an antidumping analysis in defining the affected domestic
industry and products; 29 the key question would be whether the lost
profits to "materially injured" U.S. firms are monopoly rents because of
the oligopolistic or monopolistic structure of the affected industry. If
so, the dumping will actually improve competition by diminishing or
eliminating monopoly rents, and no antidumping duties should be im-
posed. Antidumping duties are warranted, therefore, only to the ex-
tent the injury corresponds with the losses to a competitive industry.3 0
28 See, e.g., High Capacity Pagers from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410, Inv. No. 731-TA-102
(Oct. 1983) (final admin. review), 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1721 (1983). In an antidumping case,
the International Trade Commission does not require a fine-tuned showing of a cause and
effect relationship. Factors other than dumping may, in fact, cause injury to the domestic
industry, such as quality problems, labor difficulties, and supply problems. Nevertheless, the
ITC must not weigh these various causes against each other, and even though other factors
have contributed to injuring the domestic industry, a finding may be made that the dumping
is nevertheless a cause of material injury. See, e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods from Israel,
USITC Pub. 1840, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-217 and 731-TA-318 (Apr. 1986) (prelim. review).
29 In an antidumping case, the investigation of injury requires the identification of a
domestic U.S. industry that may have suffered material injury. Industry is defined as the
domestic producer of a like product. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (A) (1993). In antidumping cases
there are no strict tests for determining "like products." In some cases, like products, may
include substantially similar articles such as components or sub-assemblies. See, e.g., Cellular
Mobile Telephones and Sub-assemblies from Japan, U.S. ITA, final determination, 50 Fed.
Reg. 45447 (1985); High Capacity Pagers from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410, Inv. No. 731-TA-102
(Oct. 1983) (final admin. review), 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1721 (1983). In other cases the term
like product is very narrowly defined. See, e.g., Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITC
Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (final admin. review), 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969, 1970 (June
1985) (defining like product as red raspberries packed in bulk containers for sale to
remanufacturers, excluding all other types of fresh market and retail packed red raspber-
ries). Because the U.S. domestic industry is defined in terms of like products, there is very
little precision in defining such an industry. See Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A
Competition Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1153, 1175-79 (1989); N. David Palmeter, Injury
Determinations in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases-A Commentary on US. Practice, 21
J. WORLn TRADE L., Feb. 1987, at 7. The imprecision of the definition of "like product" and
"domestic industry" in a dumping case contrast sharply with the precision of an inquiry
under an antitrust case where such considerations as cross elasticity of demand will be care-
fully analyzed in determining like products and in defining the industry producing the com-
petitive products. Antitrust cases carefully consider the market power collective as well as
independent of the firms involved. See Wood, supra, at 1178-79.
SO The economic rationale for imposing antidumping duties is controversial. See Presley
L. Warner, Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Antidumping with Antitrust, 23
LAw AND POL'Y INr'L Bus. 791 (1992); Phedon Nicolaides, The Competition Effects of Dumping,
24J. WORLD TRADE L., Oct. 1990, at 115; Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The
Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 265 (1987); John J. Barcelo, The Antidumping Law:
Repeal It or Revise It, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 53 (1979). There must be a causal link
between sales at less than fair value (LTFV) and the injury, but LTFV sales need not be the
sole or even the most important cause of injury. Fundacao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 859
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
There appear to be two economic reasons for condemning the practice of dumping.
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Even here, strict economic analysis would provide a qualification, since
dumping into a competitive industry would provide purchasers of the
dumped products with an increase in wealth. In a dumping situation,
the second-line injury would occur in the dumper's home market where
barriers to arbitrage prevent the re-import of the lower-priced goods so
that prices are high. Thus, the deadweight loss of dumping is in the
First, dumping may be, in fact, predatory pricing, which is the practice of selling goods below
an economically reasonable measure of cost in order to drive out a rival and ultimately con-
trol the market. However, there are two problems in using antidumping duties to control
predatory pricing. First, most antitrust commentators agree that predatory pricing in the
U.S. market is quite rare and difficult to carry out. Predatory pricing requires not only a
campaign of below-cost sales, to eliminate target competitors, but also the particular industry
in question must have barriers to entry high enough that new firms will not come in to
replace the target firms being eliminated. Even the Supreme Court of the United States has
expressed skepticism that predatory pricing can be carried out, and demanded a high degree
of concrete evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment for the defense. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Moreover, if the antidump-
ing laws are intended to remedy predatory pricing, they overlap with both § 2 of the
Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. When compared with those two antitrust stat-
utes, the antidumping laws are extremely vague and imprecise. The Sherman Act and Robin-
son-Patman Act have quite precise standards for recovery for predatory pricing. First, a
plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury from a rival's low prices must prove that the
prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs. See, e.g., Brook
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). In most cases, this will be not
total cost but average variable cost. The second prerequisite is a demonstration that the
competitor had a reasonable prospect or a dangerous probability of recouping its investment
in below-cost prices. Id. These standards conflict with the antidumping clauses which pro-
vide relief in the form of imposition of antidumping duties for below cost pricing alone. Yet,
under the antitrust statutes, "evidence of below cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit
an inference of probable recoupment and injury to competition." Id. at 2589. A vivid illus-
tration of the difference between the antidumping statutes and antitrust laws is the fact that
U.S. color television manufacturers sued the Japanese color television industry for predatory
pricing and lost in the Matsushita Electric case; however, when the same industry filed a peti-
tion against the Japanese industry under the U.S. antidumping law, they won. Color Picture
Tubes from Japan, USITC Pub. 367, Inv. No. 731-TA-367-370 (July 1971) (final admin. re-
view). Thus, the antidumping laws are a blunt instrument for combatting predatory pricing.
There is, however, a second practice that in economic terms merits the application of
the antidumping laws. The motivation for persistent dumping may not be predatory pricing
but instead, strategic dumping to gain market share. Indeed, many companies emphasize
market share as a long-term objective rather than short-term profitability. Dumping to gain
market share is particularly a probable motive where a foreign producer enjoys monopoly
rents in its home market and can take advantage of these monopoly rents as well as cost
savings for increased production to finance its dumping practices abroad. This form of per-
sistent dumping will be possible, however, only where the home and foreign markets are
economically segregated. There also must be low elasticity of demand for the firm's product
in the home market or at least sufficient market power and little possibility of competition.
In the foreign market, there must be high elasticity of demand so that the firm will set lower
prices for foreign sales. It is evident that dumping to increase market share distorts trade.
Although consumers may be better off, producers who lose market share are worse off. See
Steven F. Benz, Low Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. Rav. 695 (1990).
Nevertheless, there are two problems with respect to applying the antidumping laws as a
remedy to correct below cost sales for the purpose of buying market share. First, the an-
tidumping law is over-inclusive because it remedies price discrimination that does not, in
fact, diminish competition. Second, even as a remedy for buying market share, antidumping
duties are only a second-best solution. The best solution would be to open the foreign pro-
ducers home market to eliminate the monopoly profits and the economic segregation of the
two markets.
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home market, borne by the disfavored customers. This would indicate
that even dumping that distorts competition in the export market
should not be impeded as long as the benefits from the cheaper goods
are greater than the adjustment costs for injured industries and
workers.
This analysis would appear to lead to the conclusion that the an-
tidumping laws should be revised to conform to competition law prin-
ciples. This solution has been proposed by several scholars,31 but it is
politically unrealistic. In fact, the antidumping laws function as a safe-
guard mechanism, frequently protecting non-competitive domestic
firms from international competition. 32 Because this is now the main
purpose of the antidumping laws, the process of imposing antidump-
ing duties should be reformed in two principal ways: (1) the imposi-
tion of relief should be discretionary and should be determined by the
President, who can act on a political basis; and (2) the ITC should be
required to make a competition analysis of the dumping in addition to
the material injury determination in order to facilitate the President's
decision.
2. The Countervailing Duty Laws
As with the antidumping laws, there are two countervailing duty
laws designed to nullify foreign subsidies. The older law, recodified in
the Tariff Act of 1930, authorized a countervailing duty if another
country had paid a "bounty or a grant upon the manufacture or pro-
duction or export" of any product.33 This extremely broad formula-
tion gained even more force because there was no necessity to find
injury to a competing U.S. industry.
In 1979, however, the United States significantly amended its
countervailing duty laws to conform to the GATT Subsidies Code.3 4
For countries accepting the Subsidies Code there is now a material
injury requirement: no countervailing duty may be imposed on goods
from these countries unless the Department of Commerce concludes
that the product is benefitting from a bounty or grant and the ITC
determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured,
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry
has been materially retarded by imports or sales for importation of the
31 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 29; Ronald A. Cass, Price Discrimination and Predation Analy-
sis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment, 61 CINCINNATI L. REv. 877 (1993).
32 SeeJAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONIsM 48-52 (1988).
33 Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988).
34 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Title I, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 151 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1988)), Implementing the GAIT Subsidies Code, Agreement on In-
terpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD Supp. (No.
26), at 56 (1980).
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subsidized goods.35 Two kinds of subsidies 36are countervailable: ex-
port subsidies and production subsidies that are not generally avail-
able, but are provided to a specific enterprise or industry. 37
The economic effect of a subsidy is to shift the total supply curve.
Depending on the relative elasticities of demand, this results in a fall in
price in benefitted markets and a corresponding increase in consump-
tion. 38 The effect on competition is similar to dumping; the subsidy
may have a beneficial or a negative effect depending on the structure
of the market. However, the "material injury" standard 39 applied in
subsidy cases does not distinguish between an injury that restores com-
petition and an injury that diminishes it. Furthermore, in counter-
vailing a subsidy, the surcharge duty is based upon the ad valorem cash
flow benefit received by producers. 40 Although this is equivalent to
the economic effect of a targeted export subsidy, it is greater than nec-
essary to counter a domestic production subsidy, upstream or input
subsidies, or even a general export subsidy because the effect of these
subsidies is spread over the entire supply curve of the subsidized
product.41
Thus, a countervailing duty will almost always increase the price of
a product above what is optimal for competitive purposes; such duties
are frequently at odds with competition policies.
3. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
a. Background of Section 337
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193042 is another trade law that
restricts imports on the ground of unfairness. This statute prohibits:
[u] nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale . . . the effect ... of
which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry... in the United
States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to re-
strain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.4 3
In addition, section 337 prohibits the importation (or sale for im-
portation) into the United States of goods that infringe upon valid
U.S. intellectual property rights. There is no need to show injury be-
35 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2) (1988).
36 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1988). The term subsidy is statutorily equivalent to bounty or
grant.
37 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1988).
38 Joseph F. Francois, Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis, 26 J.
WORLD TRADE L., Feb. 1992, at 5; Erna van Duren, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Counter-
vailing Duties, 25J. WORLD TRADE L., Feb. 1991, at 91.
39 The material injury standard applicable to subsidies cases is identical to the statutory
language regarding material injury in dumping cases. See Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 701 (a) (2),
731(2), 771(7), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2), 1677(7) (1988).
40 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1988).
41 See van Duren, supra note 38, at 96-97.
42 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988).
43 Id.
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cause it is conclusively presumed. A section 337 action may be filed by
a private complainant or on the ITC's own initiative. 44 The investiga-
tion undertaken by the ITC culminates in a trial-type hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge. Relief can be speedy and effective: an
order excluding the offending, articles from the U.S. market.45 The
President has the option to disapprove an order for section 337 relief
within sixty days, 46 but this power is sparingly used.
47
In evaluating section 337, it appears that substantively this statute
simply duplicates prohibitions already contained in other laws. The
antitrust prohibitions would be available under the Sherman Act sec-
tions 1 and 2 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Indeed, the
language of section 337 mirrors section 5 of the FTC Act.48 The intel-
lectual property protection provisions of section 337 also do not estab-
lish any new substantive rights. Violations of statutory intellectual
property rights are simply made an unfair trade practice. Apart from
section 337, such violations could be the subject of an infringement
action in U.S. district court.49
Procedurally, however, section 337 has enormous advantages over
district court cases. First, the jurisdiction of the ITC under section 337
is not based upon in personam principles, but upon in rem jurisdiction
over the imported product.50 This eliminates the difficulties of extra-
territorial jurisdiction over foreign defendants that might arise in U.S.
district court cases. Second, the ITC proceeding is also a public investi-
gation with the full power of the U.S. government behind it. A foreign
defendant faced with exclusion of its products from the U.S. market
cannot easily avoid prompt disclosure of information and discovery of
documents as it may in a district court proceeding. 5 1 Third, the short
statutory time limits for a section 337 proceeding, twelve months which
can be extended to eighteen months in complex cases,5 2 is much more
expeditious than district court cases. Fourth, the remedy in a section
337 case-an exclusion order, excluding the goods from entry into the
United States, as well as a cease and desist order 5 3-is often more ef-
44 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1988).
45 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988).
46 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1988).
47 For an account of section 337 procedure, see Martin Nettesheim, Sec. 337 of the Trade
Act of 1930: Unfair Methods of Competition, in U.S. TRAnE BAMERS: A LEGAL ANALYsis 325
(Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 1991).
48 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988).
49 See generally Grant E. Finlayson, Rethinking the OverlappingJurisdictions of Section 337 and
the U.S. Courts, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L., Apr. 1987, at 41.
50 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988).
51 See generally William L. Lafuze & Patricia F. Stanford, An Overview of Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930: A Primer for Practice Before the International Trade Commission, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 459 (1992).
52 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
53 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1988).
[VOL. 19
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ANTITRUST
fective than the injunctive relief available in district court.54 Thus, the
procedural and remedial characteristics of section 337 burdens import
competition.
In 1989, a GATT Panel confirmed that section 337 burdened im-
port competition; it found that section 337 violated the national treat-
ment obligation of the GATT, Article III:4. 5 5 The Panel concluded
that section 337 affords less favorable treatment to imported goods be-
cause (1) they must contend with two forums, the ITC and district
court, to adjudicate violations whereas domestic firms can be sued only
in district court;56 (2) the time limits unique to section 337 discrimi-
nate against importers; 57 and (3) the available remedies in section 337
are less favorable to imported products. 58 The United States has ac-
cepted this Panel Decision, but section 337 has not yet been reformed.
b. Should Section 337 Be Changed? Is It Needed?
The antitrust cause of action provided under section 337 is super-
fluous and probably can be eliminated. Antitrust practitioners and pri-
vate litigants do not find section 337 very useful because there is no
provision for damages, and the President can make an essentially unre-
viewable political decision to deny section 337 relief even where it is
granted by the ITC.5 9 As far as the U.S. government is concerned,
section 337 is not needed because it duplicates the power to sanction
foreign unfair acts under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.60
On the other hand, the intellectual property aspects of section
337 merit retention. Although certain aspects of the U.S. intellectual
property laws, for example, the first-to-invent system of patent registra-
54 An exclusion order is automatically enforceable by the U.S. Customs Service.
55 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930: Repotl by the Pane4 GATT Doc. L/6439,
at 47 (Nov. 1989).
56 Id
57 Id.
58 Id
59 An example of this is the Pipe and Tube case in 1978, which involved a complaint that
steel pipe and tube products were being imported from Japan and sold at below cost with the
intent to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States. The ITC recom-
mended relief, but President Carter disapproved this determination on the ground that the
proposed order would simply result in shifting the current level of imports among existing
foreign suppliers and would have no benefit either to promote competition for the U.S. pipe
and tube industry. See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, USITC Pub. 863, Inv.
No. 337-TA-29 (Dec. 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 70,789.(1978).
60 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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tion 6l and the restrictions on "gray market" goods,62 are arguably an-
ticompetitive, the United States has an important stake in combating
the unique problems of piracy of intellectual property rights and disre-
gard of recognized intellectual property rights by many foreign compa-
nies and governments. The GATT, Article XX(d), recognizes a limited
exception to the national treatment requirements of Article 111:2 if the
measures are necessary to secure compliance with substantive intellec-
tual property laws. Thus, section 337 should be retained to allow ac-
tion against imports infringing upon U.S. intellectual property rights,
but should be reformed to comply with GATT norms.63 U.S. intellec-
tual property laws should be reformed to eliminate anticompetitive as-
pects by allowing parallel imports of gray market goods, and a first-to-
file system of registration should be instituted for patent rights to con-
form to international practice.
4. The Escape Clause
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 197464 is a safeguard measure or
"escape clause" authorized by Article XIX of the GATT" that provides a
temporary remedy for a domestic industry that is suffering actual or
threatened serious injury due to import competition. The purpose of
this law is to give the industry (and the workers involved) a grace pe-
riod during which it can adjust to freer international competition. 65
61 Although the United States has justifiable objections with respect to the inadequacy
of intellectual property protection in many countries, the U.S. "first-to-invent" filing system
for patents is substantially different from the "first-to-file" procedure that is virtually universal
outside of the United States. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has rec-
ommended a number of changes in the U.S. patent law in order to harmonize it with interna-
tional practice. See, e.g., Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 89 (1993); Vito J. DeBari, International
Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-File Debate, 16
FoDIniAm INr'L LJ. 687 (1993).
62 Gray market goods are trademarked goods purchased abroad and sold in competi-
tion with goods distributed by the domestic registered trademark holder. A more polite term
is "parallel importing." See generally Andrew Ruff, Releasing the Grays: In Support of Legalizing
Parallel Imports, 11 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 119 (1992). The United States Supreme Court in K-
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), defined three parallel import scenarios:
first, where the distributor is totally independent of the foreign manufacturer and may be
fully vested of the right to the local trademark; second, where the foreign manufacturer and
the distributor may be affiliated either through common ownership of a local trademark or
because of a corporate relationship; and third, where the domestic mark holder may author-
ize the foreign manufacturer to use the trademark. In the K-Mart case, the Supreme Court
held that imports of gray market goods should be restrained in the first and third scenarios
but should be allowed under the second scenario. K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 294. The United
States thus restrains parallel imports to a greater extent than its principal trading partners,
Canada, the EU, and Japan. See Ruff, supra, at 123-29.
63 See generally Daniel J. Plaine et al., Protection of Competitors or Protection of Competition:
Section 337 and the Antitrust Laws, 56 ANcrrRusr LJ. 519 (1987).
64 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
65 See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7263. Although § 201 is the U.S. version of the safeguard clause authorized by Article XIX of
the GAIT, there are several differences between § 201 and Article XIX. First, GAIT Article
XIX contains the requirement that the increase in imports results from "unforeseen develop-
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Section 201 is usually triggered by the filing of a petition by a represen-
tative of the affected domestic industry, 66 but an investigation can be
initiated also by the U.S. government. 67 Section 201 investigations are
carried out by the ITC.68 The ITC must first identify the domestic in-
dustry that is potentially affected, i.e., one that is "producing an article
like or directly competitive" with an imported article. 69 Second, the
ITC determines whether an article is being imported in "increased
quantities";70 this can be either absolutely or relatively compared to
domestic production. 71 Third, as a prerequisite for recommending re-
lief, the ITC must find that the industry is experiencing "serious injury
or the threat thereof."72 Fourth, the ITC must determine that the in-
creased imports are a "substantial cause" 73 of the serious injury, which
is defined as "a cause which is important and not less than any other
cause."
74
Upon finding that the statutory requirements of section 201 are
satisfied, the ITC will recommend to the President appropriate relief
for the involved domestic industry. This recommendation may take
the form of increased tariff duties, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or adjust-
ment assistance. 75 The President also may initiate international nego-
tiations with concerned states, negotiate an orderly marketing
agreement with foreign governments, proclaim an auction of import
licenses, or propose new legislation. 76
In determining the appropriate relief, the President may consider
a variety of factors, including the efforts being made by the industry to
adjust to international competition, the economic and social costs in-
ments." This is not required by U.S. law. Second, the GATT provision requires that the
increase in imports results from tariff concessions, and § 201 does not impose this require-
ment. Third, the causation standard in the GATT escape clause differs from § 201 in that it
requires only that the injurious imports "cause" serious injury or the threat thereof; the U.S.
standard in § 201 is "substantial cause."
66 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1988).
67 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1)(A) (1988).
68 Id.
69 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A) (1988).
70 Id.
71 Birch Plywood Doorskins, USITC Pub. 743, at 12-13, Inv. No. TA-201-1 (Oct. 1975).
72 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A) (1988).
73 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(B) (1988).
74 H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 46-47 (1973). This causation requirement
is a higher hurdle to overcome than causation under the antidumping or countervailing duty
laws. A case in point is Certain Motor Vehicles, USITC Pub. 1110, Inv. No. TA-201-44 (Dec.
1980), which involved an application for § 201 relief by the U.S. automobile industry. The
ITC denied relief finding that the depressed condition of the U.S. auto industry was due to
recession and the industry's inability to respond to changing consumer tastes. According to
the ITC, imports were only a subordinate cause. In 1988, § 201 was amended to require that
the ITC, in considering the condition of the domestic industry, may not aggregate the causes
of declining demand associated with a recession or economic downturn into a single cause of
serious injury. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (2) (A) (1988). This makes a finding of substantial cause
more likely in cases where declining demand for domestic goods coincides with recession.
75 19 U.S.C § 2253(a) (1988).
76 d.
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volved, and the effect on consumers and competition in domestic mar-
kets. 77 The range of factors involved provides the President with a
wide latitude of discretion in granting or denying relief as well as in
deciding what relief is appropriate. 78
Section 201 relief is usually inconsistent with the procompetition
policies of the antitrust laws. Section 201 relief in whatever form (ex-
cept adjustment assistance, which is rarely granted) will diminish com-
petition and probably raise prices. Section 201 relief can be justified,
however, if its intended purpose, i.e., the preservation of American in-
dustries and employment, outweighs the costs to competition and con-
sumers in any given case. The question then becomes whether there is
an adequate statutory mechanism for identifying and weighing the
costs and benefits involved. 79 The answer regrettably is no; although
the President can consider the costs to consumers and competition,
there is complete freedom to disregard them.80 Because the section
201 process is very political, it may be desirable to maintain the Presi-
dent's flexibility. At a minimum, the statute should be amended to
require the ITC to assess the competitive consequences of its recom-
mendation and transmit this information to the President.
5. Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197481 is the most open-ended of
all the trade remedy laws. This section permits the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to retaliate against unfair trade practices
by any foreign country. A section 301 action may be initiated by a pri-
vate "interested person,"82 with the investigation being handled by the
USTR.83 An unfair trade practice under section 301 can be (1) a de-
nial of rights under a trade agreement; (2) a foreign act or practice
that denies benefits or is inconsistent with any trade agreement; or (3)
a foreign act or practice that is "unjustifiable and burdens or restricts
United States commerce." 84
77 I
78 Id.
79 In Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55 (July 1985), the ITC
made the point that the escape clause relief should "assist industries to adjust out of a situa-
tion where there has been a fundamental shift in comparative advantage to low-cost produ-
cers." Id. at n.17. In some cases, the U.S. industry achieves these goals. In the Harley
Davidson Motorcycle case, Harley sought § 201 relief in 1982 when it was on the verge of
bankruptcy. Imports from Japan in terms of high quality cheaper heavy motorcycles were
eating into Harley's market share. The ITC granted Harley's petition and the president
granted relief. During the period when it was shielded from imports, Harley made a come-
back in the marketplace by cutting its costs and developing new products. See Heavyweight
Motorcycles, USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47 (Feb. 1983).
80 Judicial review in an escape clause case is very limited. See Maple Leaf Fish Co. v.
United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
81 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
82 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1988).
83 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2)-(4) (1988).
84 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(1) (1988).
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Relief under section 301 is equally broad. The USTR may raise
tariffs, impose quotas, withdraw previously negotiated trade conces-
sions, or enter into a trade-restrictive agreement with the offending
country. Retaliation measures can include trade restrictions on prod-
ucts other than the products that are the subject of dispute.8 5
Section 301 is a highly political remedy that is used to combat un-
fair practices that close export markets to American products either in
the country employing the practice or in third-country markets. As
such, it complements antitrust policy by increasing global competition.
Occasionally, however, retaliation can lessen competition by sanction-
ing international settlements that raise prices, divide markets, or place
numerical limits on imports. The U.S.-Japan semiconductor agree-
ment,8 6 which authorized a de facto horizontal price-fixing arrange-
ment for semiconductor chips in the United States, serves as an
example. A study of the effect of section 301 relief on competition
should be a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of any remedy
under this section.
6. Voluntary Restraint Agreements
One of the most egregious conflicts between the antitrust law and
trade concerns voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs). The VRA is
a government-to-government agreement or understanding whereby
numeric limits are placed on exports of a particular class of products.8 7
VRAs are essentially safeguard devices that protect domestic industries
85 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988).
86 Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Sept. 2, 1986, U.S.-Ja-
pan, 25 I.L.M. 1409. This arrangement resolved disputes between the United States and
Japan concerning the alleged dumping of semiconductor chips as well as a § 301 petition
asking for relief because of closed markets for American semiconductor chips in Japan. The
arrangement requires Japan to monitor costs and prices of specific semiconductor products,
and Japan agreed to establish an organization to assist foreign semiconductor sales within
Japan. Id. at 1410-12. While the aspect of the agreement that requires Japan to facilitate
foreign semiconductor sales in Japan through the promotion of long-term relationships be-
tween Japanese and foreign firms and even joint ventures promotes competition in Japan,
with respect to the United States market, the agreement impedes competition by authorizing
private firms to enter into a horizontal agreement on the price of semiconductors being sold
in the United States. See Letter from Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. De-
partment of.Justice to Makota Kuroda, Vice Minister for International Affairs, Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (July 30, 1986) (on file with author). The Justice Depart-
ment essentially agreed to immunize Japanese implementation of the agreement from en-
forcement under the antitrust laws. InJune 1991, the United States andJapan extended the
semiconductor arrangement for an additional five years. See US. and Japan Sign Semiconductor
Pact Targeting 20 Percent Share, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 845 (1991). On this
occasion the Justice Department again issued a letter confirming that the modified arrange-
ment would not give rise to a violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Correspondence from
William P. Barr, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department ofJustice, to Ambassador Ryohei
Murata (June 11, 1991) (on file with author); Correspondence from James F. Rill, Assistant
Attorney General Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Noboru Hatakeyama,
Vice Minister for International Affairs, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Aug. 1,
1991) (on file with author).
87 E.g., Michael M. Kostecki, Export-Restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization, 10
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
from import competition. Their popularity stems from the fact that
they provide a "quick fix" that is politically clean since the onus of
enforcement is typically placed on the exporting country. In addition,
there is a tacit understanding that no compensation will be demanded
by the exporting country, which would otherwise have this right under
the principal safeguard provision of the GATT, Article XIX. The pro-
cess of negotiating and carrying out a VRA is typically conducted be-
hind closed doors. Legislative approval is not required, and there are
not any public hearings on the implications or consequences. The
VRA is simply announced as a fait accompli and politically trumpeted as
a triumph, particularly for the importing country. 88
What makes the VRAs so pernicious is that they are the remedy of
choice for the "big" cases. Such cases involve hugely important eco-
nomic sectors, such as steel, autos, machine tools, or semiconductors,
and are too hot to handle as ordinary antidumping or section 201
cases; thus, they are "settled" by VRAs.
The first major use of VRAs was in connection with the crisis over
steel imports in the late 1960s. After extensive negotiations with the
U.S. government, Japanese and European producer associations
signed letters stating their intention to limit steel exports to the United
States to certain specified tonnage.8 9
This VRA was challenged in court by Consumers Union of the
United States which charged: (1) that the officials of the executive
branch in negotiating and accepting these representations and in
monitoring compliance were acting beyond the scope of their dele-
gated authority; (2) that the steel import restraints violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act; and (3) that existing trade legislation preempted the
field and constituted the sole source of executive power to grant relief
against imports.90
In Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger,9 1 the validity of the
VRA was upheld. After analyzing the existing trade legislation, the ma-
jority concluded that, although Congress had comprehensively dealt
with enforceable import restrictions, foreign assurances of voluntary re-
straint did not purport to be enforceable and could not conflict with
WORLD ECON. 425 (1987); KentJones, The Decline of Liberal Trade, 16 WORLD COMPETITION 17
(1993).
88 On May 1, 1981, the United States and Japan signed a VRA on automobiles, restrict-
ing the import ofJapanese passenger cars into the United States to 1.68 million units. For an
evaluation and discussion of the VRA, see Jeannette Schuler, Voluntary Export Restraints, in
U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 463 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von Bogdandy eds.,
1991).
89 See Malcolm D. H. Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas and U.S. Trade Polity-A New Non-
Tariff Barrier, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 10 (1973).
90 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (1974), vacated in part,
sub nom., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
91 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
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legislative actions mandates. 92 The court did not reach the antitrust
issue because the plaintiff had stipulated that the Sherman Act count
should be dismissed with prejudice. 93 Although the district court had
found that the steel arrangements were not exempt from the antitrust
laws, and that the executive had no power to exempt them, the court
of appeals vacated this aspect of the district court's order. Judge
Leventhal filed a powerful dissenting opinion. He argued that the
steel arrangements were not really "voluntary"; instead, they were part
of a bilateral undertaking concluded after extensive negotiations.
Thus, the executive negotiation and acceptance of the VRA undertak-
ings were preempted by Congress.94
Consumers Union has come to be regarded as a seminal case. Con-
gress has allowed VRAs to flourish and has approved the related tech-
nique of orderly marketing arrangements as a policy option in the
Trade Agreements Act of 1974.95 Thus, the U.S. government has con-
tinued to use VRAs, but negotiations now are invariably with govern-
ments. In the 1980s, many extremely important VRAs were employed.
For example, on May 1, 1981, after negotiations with American offi-
cials, Japan announced that it was limiting exports of autos to the
United States to 1.68 million units per year.96 This was accompanied
by a letter from the U.S. Justice Department asserting that because the
export limitations involved were to be compelled by the Japanese gov-
ernment, no antitrust violation was involved.97 Additional VRAs in the
1980s have involved steel, machine tools, and semiconductors.98
a. VRA Costs
VRAs may have utility as a safeguard device, but the costs they im-
pose on consumers of the products involved are typically very high. By
shifting the supply curve for the good toward scarcity, the result is
higher prices, not only for the imported product now in short supply,
but also for competing domestic products that can be priced higher
92 Id. at 140-43.
93 Id. at 139.
94 Id. at 146-49 (Leventhal,J., dissenting).
95 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3)(E) (1988). Orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) are
quantitative restrictions that are negotiated with the exporting nation. Unlike VRAs, OMAs
are administered by the importing nation and are the subject of formal agreement.
96 This VRA followed an ITC determination in a § 201 case that imports of automobiles
were not a substantial cause of serious injury to the U.S. industry. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 1110 CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND CERTAIN CHASSIS AND BODIES
THEREOF (Dec. 1980). For the Japanese announcement of the VRA, see U.S. Import Weekly
(BNA) No. 76, at A-I, N-I (May 6, 1981). The U.S.Justice Department cleared this VRA on
antitrust grounds. See Donald E. DeKieffer, Antitrust and the Japanese Auto Quotas, 8 BRooKL J.
INT'L L. 59 (1982). See also Michael W. Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automo-
bile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market Principles
of the United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HA.Rv. INrr'L L.J. 99 (1986).
97 Letter from Attorney General Smith to Japanese Investor Okawara (May 7, 1981),
reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 406 (2d ed. 1983).
98 SPENCER W. WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAw ch. 14 (1992).
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without losing ground to their import competition. For example, the
ITC has estimated the cost of the auto VRA to be $15.7 billion from
1981 to 1984.99 In most cases, the profits of foreign exporters do not
suffer from a VRA because the scarcity rent resulting from higher
prices is collected by the exporting companies.
b. VRAs and the GATT
VRAs exist outside the GATT structure because no nation will
challenge them. The nations directly involved will tacitly agree not to
invoke GATT norms, and third countries will remain silent also; they
are usually doing the same thing in other areas. Thus, there has never
been a definitive GATT ruling on VRAs. Their defenders argue that
VRAs do not have to comply with GATT requirements because of their
"voluntary" nature, but this is the same disingenuous reasoning as that
of the majority opinion in Consumers Union.'00
The GATT allows a contracting party to impose import restraints
only in specified situations and after following strict procedures. Arti-
cle XIX, the GATT safeguard clause, conditions this remedy on "un-
foreseen developments" which, along with trade concessions, cause
increased imports of a product, which in turn cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive prod-
ucts.10' The GATT article XIX remedy is limited to a temporary sus-
pension of trade concessions previously granted, and even then the
exporting state may demand compensation.10 2
VRAs would appear to violate Article XIX of the GATT because
they rarely fulfill these requirements. VRAs also typically violate GATT
Article I, the most favored nation (MFN) clause, since they are selec-
tive, granting trade relief only to the nation with which they are negoti-
ated. Finally, VRAs also violate Article XI of the GATT, which forbids
quantitative restrictions.10 3 VRAs are essentially illegal export quotas.
This was confirmed by a GATT panel decision 10 4 in 1988 on a chal-
99 U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, A REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THEJAPANESE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT
AGREEMENTS IX (Feb. 1985).
100 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1004 (1975). The Agreement of Safeguards of the GATT Uruguay Round adopts
major new restrictions on VRAs. The agreement stipulates that a member, in the future,
shall not seek or maintain any voluntary export restraint or orderly marketing agreement,
and all such measures are to be phased out within four years. An exception is permitted for
one specific measure for each importing nation, but even this must be phased out by Decem-
ber 31, 1999. Agreement on Safeguards, Section VI, Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Version of December 15, 1993, MTN/FA
(Dec. 15, 1993).
101 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187..
102 Id.
103 Jd.
104 Japan-Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel Adopted on May 4, 1988, the
GATT, BISD 35S/116, 117.
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lenge brought by the EU 10 5 to the Agreement on Semiconductor
Trade between the United States and Japan. The panel stated that the
Japanese government was using a coherent system to restrict imports in
violation of Article XI:1; the government requested that companies not
export semiconductors at prices below costs, and it systematically
monitored costs and prices to pressure manufacturers to align their
production to meet demand forecasts.' 06 Although the panel limited
its ruling to the aspect of the Semiconductor Agreement that re-
strained exports to the EU, the same reasoning would carry over to
VRA restrictions themselves. There is no exemption in Article XI for
export restraints imposed with the consent of the importing nation. 10 7
c. VRAs and Antitrust
VRAs are typically enforced by the exporting country. This usually
involves the formation of an export cartel among producers in the ex-
porting country. At a minimum, the export cartel will agree to divide
market share, usually on the basis of historic factors. The cartel also
may fix prices. In addition, the terms and conditions of export sales
may be assigned.108
There is little question that such an export cartel would be per se
illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act because it restrains compe-
tition in the United States. Despite this, VRAs have not been chal-
lenged on antitrust grounds since the ill-fated Consumers Union'0 9
decision. There are two reasons for this. First, those most affected by
the VRA, consumers, would not have standing to raise a claim under
the Sherman Act;' 10 importersand competitors would have standing,
but they lack an economic incentive to bring suit. Second, the defense
of "foreign sovereign compulsion", would apply to most VRAs:I' the
exporting nation, at the behest of the U.S. Department of Justice,
makes sure that the export arrangement is compelled by law and invol-
105 The Maastricht Treat, which became effective on November 1, 1993, provides that
the European Community be renamed the European Union (EU). See Maastricht Treaty on
Political Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 255 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993).
106 Japan-Trade in Semiconductors, supra note 104, at 121.
107 Id. at 125.
108 See, e.g., Mitsuo Matsushita & Robert Repeta, Restricting the Supply of Japanese
Automobiles, Sovereign Compulsion or Sovereign Collusion, 14 W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47 (1982).
109 In the district court opinion in Consumers Union, Judge Gesell stated in dicta that a
"flat agreement among private foreign producers mutually to limit a substantial amount of
goods to be sold in the United States is a violation of the Sherman Act." Consumers Union
of the U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated in part, 506 F.2d
136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
110 Consumers generally do not have standing to sue under the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
111 The defense of foreign sovereign compulsion is similar on policy grounds to the act
of state doctrine. The defense applies when a foreign national establishes that it violated
U.S. law as a result of obeying directives of its own government. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441(1) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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untary so as to leave little doubt that the requirements of the defense
of foreign sovereign compulsion would be fulfilled.
d. Managed Trade
"Managed trade" is a political slogan that seeks to provide a quick
solution to trade deficit problems by artificial government manipula-
tion of trade flows. Managed trade takes the VRA technique one step
further since the export-surplus nation must not only agree to restrain
exports, it also must agree to import a certain market share of the
same or related products from the other nation involved. Managed
trade thus requires an intricate interrelationship of government-com-
pelled cartels. Export cartels in both nations would be needed as well
as an import cartel in the export-surplus nation. Although these ar-
rangements might be protected from antitrust challenge by the foreign
sovereign, there is little question that they massively restrain competi-
tion in the traditional sense.
Regretfully, many governments, including the United States, are
increasingly ambivalent about managed trade. Despite free trade rhet-
oric, they weave a fabric of quotas, restraints, and other arrangements
around trade flows, and even trade "targets" are justified as remedies
of last resort.1 12
112 See generally FRED BERGSTEN, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES (1993).
"Managed trade" usually involves numerical "targets" for trade flows. A numerical tar-
get-based trade policy violates several GATT articles including Article I:1 (the most-favored
nation obligation), Article XI:I (prohibiting quotas), and Article III:4 (the national treat-
ment obligation). Article 1:1 is violated if a government uses numerical targets to discrimi-
nate in favor of imports of certain countries. Article XI:I is violated if the target number is
administered as a quota.
Even if the target is a minimum figure and not a quota, Article III:4 is a principle which
is violated if a government makes discriminatory distinctions between imports and domestic
products even if the differential treatment is designed to favor imports.
Although Article III:4 of the GATT is worded in terms of requiring imports to be "ac-
corded treatment no less favorable" than that accorded to like products of national origin,
the purpose of this article is clearly to impose an obligation of non-discrimination between
imported and domestic products that would be violated by government requirements to
favor imported products.
This is clear from the history and interpretation of Article III:
(1) In the REPORT OF THE PANEL ON ITALIAN DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMPORTED AGRICUL-
TURAL MACHINERY, BISD 75/60 (1959), the Panel commented on this language as follows:
the intention of the drafters of the [GATT] Agreement was clearly to treat the
imported products in the same way as the like domestic products once they had been
cleared through customs (emphasis supplied).
Id., para 11.
(2) The principle of non-discrimination is clearer in the official French text of the
GATT, which states that imported products
"ne seront pas soumis ;! un traitment moins favorable."
A correct English translation of the French text is that imported products "must not be
treated less favorably" than domestic products.
Thus, it is clear from the French text that Article 111:4 is a principle of neutrality or non-
discrimination between imported and domestic products. The French text avoids the "no less
favorable" language that implies that discrimination in favor of imports is permissible. This is wrong.
(3) This also is recognized by all academic commentaries on Article III:4. For example,
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7. Misuse of the Trade Laws
Most of the U.S. trade laws restraining imports provide standing
for domestic companies to criticize their foreign competitors. While
the normal use of such procedures should not raise antitrust questions,
there may be cause for concern about the overzealous use of trade laws
to lessen foreign competition. Such misuse of the trade laws may oc-
cur as follows: (1) a baseless trade law petition may be filed to harass a
foreign competitor or to cause great expense; or (2) a collusive settle-
ment may be concluded with a foreign competitor outside the frame-
work of the trade laws.1 13
These two instances, if factually proved, would seem to trigger lia-
bility and damages under the antitrust laws. Although the Noerr-Pen-
nington" 4 doctrine would provide antitrust immunity for private
parties initiating and participating in trade relief actions, the "sham
exception" 115 to this doctrine would outlaw the intentional filing of a
baseless trade petition and the knowing submission of false informa-
tion. Private party participation in settlements of trade disputes would
be protected conduct within the context of the trade laws;' 16 however,
a settlement agreement directly with foreign competitors or on an in-
dustry-to-industry basis risks being illegal under section 1 of the Sher-
Professors Jackson and Davies, in their book INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 483 (2d
ed. 1988), state that:
The national treatment obligation, like the MFN obligation, is a rule of "non-
discrimination." They further state that: The national treatment clause ... at-
tempts to impose the principle of non-discrimination as between goods which
are domestically produced, and goods which are imported .... National treat-
ment obligations are designed to reinforce the basic policy of trade liberalization-
minimizing government interference and distortion of transactions which cross borders.
Id.
113 See Spencer W. Waller, Abusing the Trade Laws: An Antitrust Perspective, 17 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 487 (1985); Pierre F. De Revel d'Esclapon, Non-Price Predation and the Improper Use
of U.S. Unfair Trade Laws, 56 ANTITRusT L.J. 543 (1987);Joe Sims & Edith E. Scott, Antitrust
Consequences to Private Parties of Participation in and Settlement of Selected Trade Actions, 56 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 561 (1987).
114 This doctrine holds that the antitrust laws do not prohibit competitors from associat-
ing with each other in order to convince the legislative or executive branch of the govern-
ment to take some action, even anticompetitive action. See, e.g., California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
115 The sham exception holds that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine will not protect a
firm or group of firms that use governmental petitioning as a sham. See, e.g., Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993); California
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); In re Burlington N., 822 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1987).
116 The trade laws do not exempt anticompetitive activity that would be illegal under the
antitrust laws; however, the trade laws provide for specific settlement procedures. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1988), which provides for termination or suspension of countervailing duty
cases, and 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c) (1988), which provides for termination or suspension of an-
tidumping cases. There would be implied immunity under the antitrust laws as long as pri-
vate parties follow these statutory procedures. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1974).
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man Act.'117
C. The Trade Laws and International Competitiveness
The international trade laws as presently administered are ineffi-
cient and counterproductive. There is no evidence that they have
contributed in any important way to American international competi-
tiveness. In fact, generally the opposite is true: they keep inefficiently
operated businesses going by penalizing consumers. Also, the trade
laws have been ineffective in lowering the American trade deficit. The
decade of the 1980s saw progressive tightening of the trade laws while,
at the same time, the trade deficit ballooned out of control. Managed
trade is a siren song that appears to offer a quick fix: that numerical
trade targets will automatically restore American competitiveness. In
fact, managed trade will backfire: government-approved antitrust vio-
lations will proliferate and the numerical export targets the United
States now regards as floors will be eventually interpreted as ceilings by
other nations. In addition, efficiently operated U.S. industries will suf-
fer as other nations use managed trade against them. Finally, the
United States will forfeit the political and economic leadership posi-
tion that it has occupied in the world since the end of World War II.
The United States continues to have an important stake in a free
and open world economy. U.S. officials still profess this ideal, but this
is increasingly mixed with protectionist actions and rhetoric.
The United States should seek to maintain a consistent position
on how the world economy works or ought to work. There is no real
alternative to free trade-admittedly an ideal-which rests on the twin
pillars of open world markets and the idea of comparative advantage.
The answer to the American trade deficit, then, is to promote the at-
tainment of these two ideals. There is much work to do to open world
markets including: (1) the implementation of the NAFTA and the
GATT Uruguay Round; (2) the definition of America's relationship to
Asia under the auspices of APEC (the Asia-Pacific Cooperation forum);
(3) the integration of the formerly Communist countries into the
world economy; (4) the economic development of the developing
world; and (5) the resolution of ongoing trade disputes with the Euro-
pean Union andJapan. We also can work to enhance our comparative
advantage by economic and political reforms to encourage savings and
investment, both public and private, and most importantly, the devel-
opment of our human resources.
The trade laws have their place. However, their administration
should be integrated with antitrust principles. Domestic industries
117 Trade settlement agreements would be tested under the rule of reason test. See Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See also National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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should not be protected from international competition except upon
careful consideration of the costs and benefits involved. Safeguard re-
lief should be available, but should only be granted for the purpose of
enhancing long-term competition after the reform of the industry in-
volved. Also, the United States should maintain the ability to retaliate
against unfair practices of other nations, but this power should be ex-
ercised in conformity with international norms.
III. The Antitrust Laws And International Competitiveness
The second aspect of the relationship between international trade
and the antitrust laws is the growing influence of those who argue that
the antitrust laws should be weakened to improve American interna-
tional competitiveness.1 18 There is a complementary trend in the
courts to adopt less restrictive interpretations of the antitrust laws. In
its seminal decision in Continental T.V, Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania,.Inc., the
Supreme Court held that non-price vertical restraints are not illegal
unless they actually threaten competition in the particular circum-
stances."19 Since Sylvania, the courts have applied a rule of reason
analysis to all vertical territorial and customer restrictions,12°and even
horizontal mergers are now challenged by the FTC and the Justice De-
partment only in very unusual circumstances.121 These developments
are, at least in part, attributable to the idea that domestic antitrust en-
forcement is less important due to international competition.
Is this correct policy? Is there any evidence that relaxation of the
antitrust laws improves American competitiveness? 122 The following
discussion will address two areas where the antitrust laws already have
118 E.g., Henry G. Manne, Economic Commentary: US. Must Update Its Merger Laws in this
Time of Foreign Competition, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONsTITUTION, Mar. 10, 1985, at K4.
119 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988), in which the Supreme Court held that a complaint by one dealer about another's
price cutting and the supplier's termination of the second dealer did not involve a price
agreement and was not illegal per se.
120 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v.
Sprayright Sery. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
121 Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the most important factor in deter-
mining whether a merger should be challenged is high market concentration. Under the
1984 merger guidelines, a challenge was "likely" if there was high market concentration.
Under the 1991 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, high market concentration is the beginning
of the analysis, and the merger can be justified by the presence of other factors, such as the
ease of market entry presence of efficiencies and the failing firm defense. U.S. Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
13, 104 (Apr. 2, 1992).
122 Some critics of the antitrust laws hold that the United States. should ease antitrust
restraints to help American corporations compete more effectively in international markets.
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Economic Commentary: U.S. Must Update Its Merger Laws in This Time of
Foreign Competition, THE ATLANTAJOURNAL-CONSTrT-rION, Mar. 10, 1985, at K4. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see Commentary: Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990s, 58
Axurrrrus L.J. 591 (1989).
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been substantially relaxed by statute to enhance U.S. competitiveness:
export cartels and joint ventures.
A. Export Cartels
The United States, along with most other industrialized countries,
continues to sanction export cartels, usually referred to as export as-
sociations, which are encouraged to facilitate exporting by American
companies. Under the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918,123 export associa-
tions composed of members engaging solely in "export trade" of goods
may register with the FTC and obtain an exemption from the Sherman
Act. 124 However, the shelter provided by the Webb-Pomerene Act is
strictly limited. Conduct which restrains trade in the United States or
hurts a domestic competitor will not be immune. 25
Because the Webb-Pomerene Act fell into disuse,' 26 Congress in
1982 passed two additional acts. First, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act' 2 7 limits the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act
over export matters. Second, the Export Trading Company Act 128
(ETC Act) provides a procedure whereby an export association can
obtain a Certificate of Review from the Secretary of Commerce (in
consultation with the Department of Justice) which insulates the asso-
ciation from criminal or civil liability under the antitrust laws for con-
duct specified in the certificate. The ETC Act exemption is broader
than the Webb-Pomerene Act. First, under the ETC Act, an export
association can export services as well as goods. Second, the ETC Act
permits banks to own and finance export trading companies. 29
There is a consensus that the various antitrust exemptions for ex-
port companies have had very little impact and have not contributed in
any important way to decrease the U.S. trade deficit or to increase the
competitiveness of U.S. firms. Although the Webb-Pomerene Act was
passed to benefit small companies, the Act is used by large firms in
concentrated industries; in 1982, there were thirty-nine registered as-
sociations (primarily large forms) accounting for between two and
123 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988).
124 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1988).
125 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1988).
126 The Webb-Pomerene Act was restrictively interpreted by the courts. E.g., United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (holding illegal the
export activities of a Webb-Pomerene association formed by producers of coated abrasives).
127 The jurisdictional provisions of the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
15 U.S.C. § 6A (1988), provide that the Sherman and Clayton Acts shall not apply to conduct
involving export trade or commerce unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect on (1) domestic U.S. commerce, (2) import commerce, or (3) the
export opportunities of a person engaged in exporting from the United States.
128 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1988).
129 15 C.F.R. § 325.2 (1992). The ETC Act created an office in the Department of Com-
merce to promote export trading companies. 15 U.S.C. § 4003 (1988).
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three percent of American exports.15 0 With only about 100 registra-
tions presently in effect, the ETC Act also has failed to live up to
expectations.1 3 1
Not only have the export association exemptions had little effect
in encouraging U.S. exports, they have produced frictions with U.S.
trading partners and encouraged cartelization abroad. Daishowa Inter-
national v. North Coast Export Co.13 2 provides an example of the an-
ticompetitive conduct encouraged by U.S. export associations. The
Daishowa case involved Japanese wood chip importers and paper manu-
facturers who formed a conspiracy to lower the price of wood chips to
counter the market power of a U.S. Webb-Pomerene association. The
district court rejected the argument of the Japanese importers that
they should have the reciprocal immunity of the U.S. Webb-Pomerene
Association.
Thus, U.S. law demands that foreign purchasers from U.S. export
associations must act competitively. Foreign antitrust authorities, how-
ever, may tolerate import cartels dealing with U.S. export associations
on the theory that they were necessary to counter the market power of
the export associations. Also, foreign antitrust authorities may pro-
ceed against export associations that might be immune under U.S. law.
In the Wood Pulp case,133 the European Court of Justice held that a
Webb-Pomerene export association of wood pulp exporters violated
EU competition law. The Court also held the conduct of foreign pro-
ducers that had no manufacturing or marketing facilities located in
the EU nevertheless subject to the EU competition laws.' 3 4 Another
effect of U.S. utilization of export cartels is to encourage their use by
our trading partners. Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and many
other states allow export cartels based on the U.S. model.13 5 It is diffi-
cult to lecture our trading partners on the evils of cartels in interna-
tional trade when we encourage their use domestically.
130 See A. Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 60 ANTrrrusT L.J. 571
(1992).
131 See Spencer W. Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading Company Program, 17 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REc. 239 (1992).
132 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64, 774 (1982).
133 A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhitio v. Commission, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14, 491
(Sept. 27, 1988). Although the Court of Justice in this case did not adopt the U.S. effects
doctrine by name, it did hold that foreign producers with no facilities in the EC were within
the EC's jurisdiction. See also the Dyestuffs case, Imperial Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Commis-
sion, 1972 Case No. 48/69, 1972 E.C.R. 619, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) § 8161 (uly 14, 1972) (holding that members of a cartel located outside of the EU
violated EU competition law where their conduct produced anticompetitive effects within
the Community). The EU merger regulation also carries hidden dangers for U.S. compa-
nies. See Marsha Cope Huie & Stephen D. Hogan, The New European Merger Control Regulation
and the Short-Term Horizon of United States Firms, 6 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 325 (1991).
134 A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhitio v. Commission, .4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14, 491
(Sept. 27, 1988).
135 Special Committee, International Antitrust Report, Sept. 1, 1991, A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST
L. 61-73. [hereinafter ABA Special Committee Report].
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As has been recommended by the Special Committee on Interna-
tional Antitrust of the American Bar Association,15 6 the U.S. Congress
should immediately repeal export association immunity and launch a
campaign to convince our trading partners to do the same. Export
associations are counterproductive. U.S. exporters find them of little
value, and any benefits to the United States are outweighed by the re-
strictive trade practices they cause or justify in response by our trading
partners. Eliminating export association immunity would remove a
source of trade friction and would justify tough U.S. action against for-
eign import cartels and restrictive practices that impede U.S. exports.
B. Joint Ventures
A second case where the antitrust laws have been relaxed to en-
hance American competitiveness is joint venture formation and opera-
tion. Joint ventures are judged under the U.S. antitrust laws on a full
"rule of reason" analysis. In United States v. Penn Olin Chemical Co., 13 7
which involved ajoint venture for the manufacture of sodium chlorate
in the southeastern United States, the Supreme Court called for analy-
sis of a range of relevant factors:
the number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the
background of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the rela-
tionship of their lines of commerce; the competition existing between
them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the
other; the setting in which the joint venture was created; the reasons
and necessities for its existence; the joint venture's line of commerce
and the relationship thereof to that of its parents; the adaptability of
its line of commerce to non-competitive practices; the potential power
of the joint venture in the relevant market; and appraisal of what the
competition in the relevant market would have been if one of the joint
venturers had entered it alone instead of through Penn-Olin; the ef-
fect, in the event of that occurrence, of the other joint venturer's po-
tential competition; and such other factors as might indicate potential
risks to competition in the relevant market 13 8
Since Penn Olin, the courts and enforcement authorities have
judged joint ventures with increasing leniency, viewing them as often
enhancing efficiency, reducing costs, and as necessary in view of in-
creasing international competition.139 Thus the Supreme Court has
rejected per se condemnation of joint ventures, 140 and the FTC has
approved joint ventures like the General Motors/Toyota production
joint venture with the justification that it was "a limited ... joint ven-
ture not a merger of GM and Toyota." 141
136 Id at 83-85.
137 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
138 Id. at 177.
139 See generally Robert Pitofsky, A Framewor* for Antitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1605 (1986).
140 Penn Olin, 378 U.S. at 163.
141 In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 386 (1984) (3-2 decision).
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The 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Op-
erations 142 also state that the Justice Department will follow a rule of
reason approach on joint ventures. The scrutinization of joint ven-
tures will focus upon three factors:
1. whether the joint venture would likely have anticompetitive
effects in the market or markets in which it proposes to operate,
2. whether the joint venture or any of its restraints would likely
have any anticompetitive effect in any other market in which the joint
venture partners are actual or potential competitors, and
3. whether there are likely anticompetitive effects associated
with any non-price vertical restraints imposed in connection with the
joint venture.1 3
If the Justice Department is satisfied that there are no significant
anticompetitive risks under these three tests, then the joint venture will
not be challenged. However, if significant anticompetitive risks are re-
vealed by these first three inquiries, then the Department will consider
a fourth factor: whether procompetitive efficiencies outweigh the risk
of anticompetitive harm. 144
The International Guidelines also recognize that joint ventures
must be judged from the viewpoint of international commerce and the
global economy:
Joint ventures may be created for a variety of good business reasons.
For example, joint ventures may be created to take advantage of com-
plementary skills or economies of scale in production, marketing, or
R&D, or to spread risk. In foreign markets in particular, joint ventures
may be politically and commercially more practical than either merger
or independent operation.
145
Despite the clear signals that economically efficientjoint ventures
will not be challenged and that the principal concerns of regulators
will be joint ventures that are shams for cartelization, the business com-
munity has continued to lobby Congress for legislation weakening the
antitrust laws to approve joint ventures. The result has been two fairly
meaningless acts whose main purpose has been to require the registra-
tion of joint ventures with attendant bureaucratic bells and whistles.
The National Cooperative Research Act 146 (NCRA) was passed in 1984
to restate the obvious, i.e., that research and development joint yen-
142 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(1988), 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Supp. Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter
1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines].
143 Id. at 11.
144 Id. at 11-12.
145 Id. at 11. The future competitiveness of many U.S. industries will depend on their
ability successfully to develop and deploy new technologies in areas such as superconductiv-
ity, high-definition television, robotics, and computer-aided design and manufacturing. The
costs of developing these technologies and bringing them to the market as quickly and effi-
ciently as possible may require joint efforts among actually or potentially competing firms,
foreign and domestic. Thornurgh Endorses Legislation to Alter Law on Joint Production, 56 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1404, at 301 (Feb. 23, 1989).
146 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
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tures are subject to a rule of reason analysis. In 1993 Congress
amended this law to reaffirm the rule of reason approach for produc-
tion joint ventures as well. 147
It is difficult to see what these two laws add to the already permis-
sive attitude towardjoint ventures except the requirement of filling out
forms to notify the antitrust bureaucracy. The 1993 amendments add
an additional irrelevance to the already admittedly irrelevant NCRA.148
If the Congress really wanted to reassure U.S. business that joint ven-
tures would not be challenged, it could enact a per se approval process
like that in the EU. 149 Under EU regulations, a joint venture can re-
ceive immunity upon the fulfillment of the following conditions:
1. that it "contributes to the improvement of the production or dis-
tribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic
progress";
2. that consumers receive an "equitable" share of the resulting
benefit;
3. that it does not impose greater restrictions on the venturers than
are necessary to accomplish the venture's objectives; and
4. that it does not increase the power of the venturers to "eliminat[e]
competition in respect of a substantial portion" of the products in
question.150
EU competition law, in contrast to U.S. antitrust law, is based
upon notification and approval of restrictive agreements that serve the
interests of the European Union. The EU exemption process is more
certain, but it is subject to bureaucratic control.
The EU model would reduce uncertainty over antitrust immunity,
but it would introduce a regulatory approval process so that the cure
would be worse than the disease. American business would undoubt-
edly resist additional governmental control of joint venture formation.
Thus, the present law offers adequate protection for joint ventures to
compete in the global marketplace.
IV. Promoting Harmonization of the Antitrust Laws
A. Reasons for Harmonization
There are two principal arguments in favor of promoting greater
antitrust law harmonization. First, lax antitrust enforcement against
entrenched domestic cartels and anticompetitive practices blocks U.S.
companies from access to foreign markets. For example, the United
147 Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
148 See the analysis of Timothy K. Armstrong, Transnational Production, Joint Ventures, and
United States Antitrust Law: Evaluating the Proposed National Cooperative Production Amendments,
28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119 (1993).
149 For analysis of European Joint Venture Regulation, see Frank L. Fine, EEC Antitrust
Aspects of Production Joint Ventures, 26 IrNr'L LAw. 89 (1992); Dana W. Hayter, Note, Scapegoat for
the Trade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment ofJoint Ventures Place the United States at a Competi-
tive Disadvantage, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 391 (1993).
150 Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, para. 3, 198 U.N.T.S. 3. For the approach of
the EEC to joint ventures, see Frank L. Fine, supra note 149.
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States contends that nonaggressive enforcement of competition laws in
Japan impedes access to the Japanese market.151 The Structural Im-
pediment Initiative (SII) talks between Japan and the United States
have led Japan's Fair Trade Commission to increase the number of
enforcement actions and raise the penalties for noncompliance.1 52
The United States has also obtained the agreement of the EU to prose-
cute anticompetitive restraints that may affect U.S. interests.1 53
A second reason to harmonize national antitrust laws is to elimi-
nate conflicting, needless, and often discriminatory obstacles to cross-
border business transactions and arrangements. An important exam-
ple of this is the national competition policies governing patent and
know-how licensing contracts. The United States, the European
Union, and Japan have adopted detailed policies on the validity of re-
strictive clauses in such agreements. The three sets of rules exhibit
marked differences, however, in both procedure and substance. The
EU relies upon a "block exemption" or safe harbor approach1 54 that
permits licensing agreements that are notified in advance and conform
to the regulation. Japan has a much more extensive set of rules that
are designed to require a balanced agreement between the parties.155
The United States has permissive rules that permit virtually any freely
bargained arrangement without the necessity of prior notification.1 56
While certain differences of approach are justified, compliance
with different regimes is often an unnecessary burden. National anti-
trust authorities could engage in a dialogue designed to reduce unnec-
essary national differences that inhibit international transactions.
Trade and investment would benefit from a policy of international co-
operation among national antitrust authorities, particularly in the ar-
eas of technology licensing, joint ventures, mergers, and distribution
arrangements.
Harmonization of the various national antitrust laws is a point that
has been considered by the ABA Special Committee on International
Antitrust.' 57 Their wise recommendations include four points: (1)
151 SeeJames F. Rill, Statement on Japanese Competition Policies and the U.S. Response before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciaty, 29July 1992, WORLD COMPETITION, Sept. 1992, at 143.
152 Id. at 145.
153 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991). The U.S.-EC agreement provides for:
(1) notification of enforcement action; (2) cooperation and consultation on matters of mu-
tual concern; (3) recognition of a right to petition each other for enforcement against con-
duct that might have an anticompetitive effect in the petitioner's area; and (4) specification
of factors that might cause abatement of an otherwise valid enforcement proceeding. Id.
154 Commission Regulation 2349/84, 1985 0.J. (L 219) 16.
155 For a detailed exposition ofJapanese law and policies in this area, see MITSUO MATSU-
SHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw IN JAPAN 258-64 (1993).
156 See U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions (1988), 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988).
157 ABA Special Committee Report, supra note 135, 1-29. See Mark R. Joelson, Harmoni-
zation: A Doctrine for the Next Decade, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 133 (1989).
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Nations should agree to prohibit cartels and cartel conduct; special
immunity provisions for export cartels should be repealed. (2) Na-
tions should strive to harmonize the timing and content of their vari-
ous premerger reporting requirements, should freely consult and
exchange information, and should coordinate their merger review
procedures. (3) Nations should harmonize their laws relating to intel-
lectual property and antitrust, particularly with respect to licensing
agreements, mergers, and joint ventures and should take care not to
undermine foreign intellectual property rights in enforcing competi-
tion laws. (4) Nations should align their antitrust doctrines relating to
antitrust immunity (nonjusticiability) because of governmental involve-
ment, such as the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, the act of
state doctrine, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception,
and the commercial, activity. exception to foreign sovereign
immunity. 158
The ABA Special Committee saw no need for the adoption of a
World Antitrust Code. 159 Citing past efforts by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) resulting in the
adoption of a Restrictive Business Practices Code, a Transfer of Tech-
nology Code, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
the ABA Special Committee concluded that a World Antitrust Code
would not contain meaningful or enforceable standards because of the
wide differences among nations.' 60
Although the ABA Special Committee may be correct about the
feasibility of a World Antitrust Code, perhaps the time is right for a
more modest proposal: The negotiation of a set of competition princi-
ples at the GATT and a "side agreement" open to all GATT members
that would set out a common understanding with regard to conflicts in
competition policy that might cause trade friction or hinder free trade.
As Sir Leon Brittan has advocated, antitrust violations that distort inter-
national trade should be subject to a GATT panel review. 161
B. The Draft International Antitrust Code
On July 10, 1993, a group of experts known as the International
Antitrust Code Working Group unveiled an ambitious proposal for an
International Antitrust Code162 to be adopted as a plurilateral trade
agreement under the auspices of the GATT. This proposal is a serious
158 ABA Special Committee Report, supra note 135, at 2-14.
159 Id. at 28-29.
160 Id. at 278-94.
161 Right Honorable Sir Leon Brittan, Q.C., A Framework for International Competi-
tion, Address before the World Economic Forum (Feb. 3, 1992).
162 Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement,
July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Special Supplement) (Aug.
19, 1993). The scope of application of the code is limited to restraints of competition affect-
ing at least two parties accepting the code. Id. art. 3, § 1.
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and comprehensive attempt to deal with the inconsistencies between
trade and antitrust rules and to establish a set of enforceable antitrust
standards to supplement the GATT. The Draft Code, however, does
not purport to modify the laws of unfair trade practices or to secure
the passage of a harmonized competition law in all countries. Rather,
it seeks to establish minimum substantive standards for national anti-
trust laws based upon principles of non-discrimination and national
treatment. 16
3
The Draft Code contains the following principles:
(1) Certain horizontal restraints such as cartels and other agree-
ments to fix prices, divide markets, or assign quotas are illegal per
se;' 64 other horizontal restraints are presumptively illegal, but may be
justified under a rule of reason analysis. 165
(2) Certain vertical restraints (distribution strategies) such as re-
sale price fixing and distribution cartels are illegal per se;166 other dis-
tribution restraints are presumptively illegal, but may be justified
under a rule of reason analysis.167 Vertical restraints should not be
used to hinder cross-border transactions.
(3) Intellectual property rights should be exercised within the
legal limits of the legal context of such rights. 168 It is permissible for
the holder of an intellectual property right to grant licenses which may
be exclusive, territorially restricted, and which impose justified obliga-
tions and restrictions.16 9 It is illegal to use intellectual property rights
163 Each party to the Draft Code would agree to adopt whatever measures are necessary
to implement its obligations. Id. art. 1.
164 Id. art. 4, § 1.
165 Id. art. 4, § 2.
166 Id. art. 5, § 1.
167 Id. art. 5, § 2.
168 Id. art. 6, § 1.
169 Id. art. 6, § 2. The Comments to this section enumerates the following non-exhaus-
tive list of permissible restrictions:
" an obligation to the licensee to procure goods and services from a given
source, insofar as obtaining such products or services from that source is
necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of a licensed invention;
" an obligation on the licensee to pay a minimum royalty or to produce a mini-
mum quantity of the licensed product or to carry out a minimum number of
operations exploiting the licensed invention;
" an obligation on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the licensed inven-
tion to one or more technical fields of application covered by the licensed
patent;
" an obligation on the licensee not to grant sub-licenses or assign the license;
" an obligation to mark the licensed product or, if applicable, the service with
an indication of the patentee's name, the licensed patent or the patent li-
censing agreement;
" an obligation on the licensee not to divulge know-how communicated by the
licensor; the licensee may be held to this obligation even after the agreement
has expired and as long as the know-how remains secret;
" an obligation to inform the licensor of infringements of the patent, to take
legal action against an infringer, and to assist the licensor in any legal action
against an infringer;
" an obligation on the licensee to observe specifications concerning the mini-
mum quality of the licensed product which are necessary for a technically
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to abuse a dominant position or to pool such rights to suppress rival
technologies.170
(4) Concentration, mergers, and restructuring of business enter-
prises which have an international dimension should be judged by na-
tional antitrust authorities using similar criteria and with full
notification to authorities in affected nations. 171 In appraising busi-
ness concentrations, national authorities should consider all competi-
tive factors, especially the competitive structure of the affected markets
and the market position of the undertakings and their financial and
economic power.172
(5) Abuse of a dominant position that adversely affects competi-
tion in any market is illegal. Such abuse may consist of
a) limiting production, markets, or technical development;
b) applying different conditions to equivalent transactions; and
c) tying agreements. 173
(6) Remedies under national laws may include fines, damages,
disgorgement of profits, injunctive relief and publication of judg-
ment.174
(7) Public undertakings that engage in economic activities that
could be carried on by private undertakings may involve restraints of
competition that are appropriate, indispensable, and proportional to
meet the public purpose. 75
The Draft International Antitrust Code proposes significant new
international institutions to ensure its observance by contracting par-
ties. An International Antitrust Authority (IAA), a new GAT[ agency,
would consist of a President and an International Antitrust Council.' 76
The IAA would have the power to ask national antitrust authorities to
initiate enforcement, to bring actions against national antitrust author-
ities in national courts, to sue private persons and undertakings in na-
tional courts, and to sue a contracting party before an International
Antitrust Panel (LAP) for alleged violations of the Code. 177 The LAP, a
satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention, and to allow the licensor
to carry out related checks;
" an obligation on the parties to communicate to one another any experience
gained in exploiting the licensed invention and to grant one another a non-
exclusive license in respect of inventions relating to improvements and new
applications;
" an obligation on the licensor to grant the licensee any more favorable terms
that the licensor may grant to another undertaking after the agreement is
entered into.
Id. art. 6, § 2 cmt. 3.
170 Id. art. 6, § 1(b).
171 Id. arts. 8-11.
172 Id. art. 11, § I(b).
173 Id. art. 14.
174 Id. art. 15 § 1(a).
175 Id. art. 16, § 1 and cmts.
176 Id. art. 19, § 1.
177 Id. art. 19, § 2.
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permanent dispute resolution body, would have the power to interpret
the Code and to resolve disputes (1) between parties and (2) between
the IAA and parties to the Code. 178
The Draft International Antitrust Code is an important proposal.
For the first time, it would make competition policy an integral part of
the GATT system of trade agreements. While the Code does not di-
rectly tackle the problem of the protectionist nature of certain interna-
tional trade laws, it would establish a competition policy as an
overriding concern in trade matters, and the dispute resolution pro-
cess would create a forum for the resolution of conflicts between pro-
tectionist trade rules and competition policy.
Nevertheless, the broad harmonization advanced by the Code is
neither economically necessary nor politically feasible. Unless its sub-
stantive principles are made as non-binding suggestions, the Code
would subject national antitrust enforcement to unacceptable stand-
ardization. Furthermore, the creation of international antitrust institu-
tions with binding authority over both national courts and national
antitrust authorities will be rejected out of hand by key nations such as
the United States.
Rather than an international antitrust enforcement bureaucracy,
the IAA should serve as a forum for consultation, discussion, and ex-
change of information. The IAA also could foster antitrust harmoniza-
tion and the syntheses of trade and antitrust by (1) identifying areas of
agreement and common principles; (2) promoting antitrust enforce-
ment that may be necessary to eliminate trade distortions; (3) recom-
mending common standards and rules where a consensus approach is
desirable and feasible; and (4) providing a forum for the resolution of
international antitrust disputes over jurisdiction, discovery, and
enforcement.
V. "Extraterritorial" Antitrust Enforcement
A. The "Extraterritoriality" Controversy
Controversy still surrounds the application of the U.S. antitrust
laws to conduct in other countries that may affect the United States.179
Several nations have enacted "blocking statutes" 180 designed to blunt
U.S. enforcement efforts, and Japan has highlighted "excessive extra-
territorial application of competition law" as an unfair U.S. trade prac-
178 Id. art. 20.
179 Although the U.S. antitrust laws were passed to deal with domestic anticompetitive
conduct, they have increasingly been applied extraterritorially. See Gary B. Born, A Reap-
praisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992). The
Supreme Court has approved this policy as "well established." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cali-
fornia, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 n.22 (1993).
180 See generally Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S. Discovery: A Con-
flict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 1061 (1984).
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tice. 18 1 The nations object that U.S. antitrust enforcement often seeks
to impose American policies that run counter to their interests and
traditions.182
A celebrated example is the case involving a Laker Airlines' suit
for damages against British Caledonian, Pan American, and several
other airlines alleging predatory pricing and a conspiracy in violation
of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.185 Laker alleged that these air-
lines reduced their fares to match Laker's and sought actual and treble
damages. 184 Because much of the necessary discovery in the case
would take place in the United Kingdom, the United States District
Court issued an injunction prohibiting the airline defendants from tak-
ing any action in a foreign forum that could impair or interfere with
the jurisdiction of the court.185
On June 27, 1983, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry of
the United Kingdom, citing his powers under the British Protection of
Trading Interest Act (PTIA),' 8 6 issued an order and general directions
prohibiting persons who carry on business in the United Kingdom
from complying with United States antitrust measures in the district
court arising out of any agreement or arrangement to which a U.K.
designated airline is a party or any act done by a U.S. designated air-
line that relates to air carriage under relevant international treaties. 187
The PTIA, a so-called "blocking" statute, works as follows. First, the act
empowers the British Secretary of State to direct any person in the
United Kingdom not to comply with a prohibition or requirement
from another country which the Secretary believes would endanger the
trading interest of the United Kingdom.18 8 Second, the Secretary can
forbid the production of documents located in Britain when this would
be prejudicial to British sovereignty.' 8 9 Third, there is no enforcement
in British courts of awards for multiple damages that are designated
competition judgments.' 90 Fourth, the British Act provides for recov-
ery of multiple damage awards by qualifying defendants that had to
pay such damages in another country. 191 This is known as a "clawback"
181 JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, 1992 REPORT ON UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES 97
(1992).
182 Id.
183 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 917 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
184 Id.
185 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
186 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.). For a discussion of the
PTIA, see A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 1980, 75 Am.J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
187 Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 1983 (SI 1983 No.
900).
188 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng).
189 1d
190 Id.
191 1&
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provision.192
On July 26, 1983, the U.K. Court of Appeal announced its judg-
ment that the order and directions were within the power of the Secre-
tary of State and were valid. 193 The order and directions of the British
executive prevented the British airlines from complying with any re-
quirements imposed by the United States District Court and prohib-
ited the airlines from relying on their own commercial documents
located within the United Kingdom to defend themselves against
Laker's lawsuit. As a result, the U.K. Court of Appeal concluded that
the United States District Court action was wholly untriable and per-
manently enjoined Laker from proceeding in the United States with its
antitrust claims against British Airways and British Caledonian. 194
The jurisdictional conflicts between the United States and the
British courts were further heightened in March 1984 when the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the dis-
trict court's protective injunction prohibiting the Laker defendants
from taking part in foreign actions designed to prevent the district
court from hearing Laker's antitrust claims. 195 The two opposing
court decisions meant that the two countries were on a collision course
regarding the issue of whether Laker would be allowed to go forward.
The problem was alleviated, however, in July 1984 when the House of
Lords in a unanimous decision1 9 6 overturned the decision of the U.K.
Court of Appeal and allowed Laker's liquidator to continue his case
against British Airways and British Caledonian in the U.S. courts.
The House of Lords reasoned that if Laker's allegations could be
proved at trial, then they disclosed a cause of action under American
law but not English law, and consequently, that the American court was
the only forum of competent jurisdiction.197 In light of this decision,
the court refused to apply English rules concerning forum non con-
veniens. The court considered it inappropriate and an obstruction of
justice to prevent access to the only court competent to resolve the
merits of the case. 198 The court rejected the claim of the British air-
lines that it was unconscionable for Laker to sue them in the United
States. The court explained that the British airlines, as well as Laker,
had voluntarily entered the U.S. market and obtained licenses to oper-
ate scheduled services under U.S. domestic laws and relevant interna-
tional treaties. In doing so, they had submitted voluntarily to U.S.
192 ld.
193 [1983] 3W.L.R. 544.
194 Id.
195 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
196 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.), repiinted in 23
I.L.M. 727 (1984). Also see Note, The Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of Rea-
son" Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief 71 CONELL L. Rav. 645 (1986).
197 British Airways, [1984] 3 W.L.R. at 416.
198 1&
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domestic law with respect to operations within the United States.1 99
The Laker case was thus resolved when the English court deferred
to the United States jurisdiction. Certainly, however, this will not al-
ways be the case. The potential for conflict because of the extraterrito-
rial applicability of U.S. antitrust laws still remains.
Nevertheless, the international community has come to realize
and international law to recognize that legislative and enforcement
competence cannot always be circumscribed by the "territorial" theory
of jurisdiction. In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Al-
coa),200 Judge Learned Hand formulated the so-called "effects" test for
antitrust jurisdiction: "[I]t is settled law.., that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities
other states will ordinarily recognize." 20 1
In the wake of the Alcoa decision, U.S. enforcement authorities
applied the antitrust laws to a wide variety of foreign practices that had
an allegedly anticompetitive effect in the United States. 20 2 This asser-
tion of power elicited protests that the United States was ignoring in-
ternational comity and respect for the sovereignty of its trading
partners. 203
B. International Comity and Judicial Restraint
In order to place some practical limits on the extraterritorial exer-
cise of jurisdiction, the federal courts fashioned principles of judicial
restraint. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,20 4 which involved
an illegal conspiracy in Honduras to prevent Timberlane from ship-
ping Honduran timber to the United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals set out a three-part test as follows:
A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated. As acknowledged above,
the antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be some ef-
fect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce before the
federal courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction
under those statutes. Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint
may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to
present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.... Third, there is the additional question
which is unique to the international setting of whether the interests of,
and links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect
on American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-i-vis those
199 Id. at 419-20.
200 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
201 Id at 443.
202 For a summary, see Joseph P. Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws and Transnational
Business Transactions: An Introduction, 21 INT'L' LAW. 307 (1987).
203 See, e.g., United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K
Protection of Trading Interests Bill, 21 I.L.M. 847 (1982).
204 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.20 5
The third part of this test is the heart of the Timberlane analysis.
The court called for a balancing of the following factors in determin-
ing whether to exercise jurisdiction:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of busi-
ness of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.2 0 6
The Timberlane "rule of reason" analysis thus rests on international
comity and conflicts-of-laws principles. 20 7 The Timberlane analysis was
followed by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.,208 which utilized these balancing factors and added the "possible
effect on foreign relations" to the Timberlane list.
The Timberlane balancing test was accepted by the American Law
Institute (ALI) in its Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, sections
402 and 403.209 Under section 402, a state may exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to (a) conduct that takes place within its
territory; (b) conduct outside its territory "that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory;" (c) activities and interests of
its nationals; and (d) activities against the state's security or similar in-
terests.2 10 In addition, Restatement section 403 requires the exercise of
jurisdiction to be reasonable, judged according to the location of the
205 Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
206 Id. at 614.
207 On remand of the case, the court applied these doctrines to dismiss the plaintiffs
complaint. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984).
208 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). This case summarizes the factors to be considered in
applying the principle of comity as follows:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here com-
pared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations, if the court exercises jurisdic-
tion and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting
requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations had addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98.
209 RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, §§ 402-403.
210 RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 402.
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alleged conduct, the effects within the regulating state, the nationali-
ties of the parties, the importance of the regulation to the regulating
state, the likelihood of conflict with another state's laws, and the extent
to which the regulation is consistent with the international system. In
the case of concurrentjurisdiction, each state has an obligation to eval-
uate its own as well as the other state's interest and should defer to
another state whose interest is "clearly greater."211
In its 1993 decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,212
the Supreme Court reaffirmed both the "effects" test for extraterrito-
rial antitrust jurisdiction and the principle of international comity.
The Hartford case made no change in the substance of the comity doc-
trine but clarified when and how comity should be applied. Justice Sou-
ter, writing for the Court's majority, employed a two-step analysis.
First, the question ofjurisdiction is to be determined by whether there
are allegations of wrongful conduct producing "some substantial effect
in the United States."213 Only after jurisdictional concerns have been
satisfied do comity concerns come into play. Second, an overriding
threshold question is whether there is a "true conflict" between U.S.
and foreign law. 214 According to the Court, which cited the Restate-
ment for the proposition that no conflict exists "where a person sub-
ject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both,"215 if
there is no alleged conflict, there is no need for the application of
comity. Thus, in the Supreme Court's view, the existence of a conflict
of laws is an essential precondition for the application of comity princi-
ples. This holding undercuts the comity doctrine and clears the way
for broader extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. 2 16
211 The Restatement specifically applies these principles to regulation by the United
States of anticompetitive conduct, so that if the "effects" test is satisfied it is presumptively
reasonable for the United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, any exer-
cise ofjurisdiction is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. RESTATEMENT, supra note
111, §§ 415 cmt. a.
212 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
213 Id. at 2909.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 2910 (citing and quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e) (1986).
216 This aspect of Justice Souter's opinion was criticized by Justice Scalia, who wrote a
dissenting opinion on this point which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas. Justice Scalia called the majority's analysis "breathtakingly broad," predicting
"sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries-particularly
our closest trading partners." Id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The nub of the differences between Justice Souter and Justice Scalia concerns the issue
of "prescriptive" international jurisdiction. According to the Restatement, "jurisdiction to
prescribe"-essentially legislative jurisdiction-is to be distinguished from "jurisdiction to
adjudicate"-the authority to subject persons or things to the judicial process. (The Restate-
ment also has a third category: jurisdiction to enforce, the authority to compel compliance
with law.) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1986).
Justice Souter's opinion assumes that the Sherman Act's grant of subject matterjurisdic-
tion is identical to jurisdiction to prescribe, and thus prescriptive jurisdiction requires no
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The U.S. Department of Justice has incorporated a more restric-
tive concept of comity in its 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations.21 7 In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, the
Department will consider:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct
within the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States
consumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of
the conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be fur-
thered or defeated by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies. 2 18
By tempering the reach of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction through the
recognition of international comity, the "effects" test has become more
acceptable. Other states have adopted similar jurisdictional concepts,
and bilateral antitrust agreements signed with AUstralia, 219 Canada,2 20
Germany,2 2' and the European Union2 22 have established a degree of
international cooperation in the field of antitrust.
further analysis. Thus comity for Justice Souter and the Court's majority is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but rather of conflicts-of-laws. Hartford Fire Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2910-11.
Justice Scalia and the four-person dissent, on the other hand, make international comity
an integral part of prescriptivejurisdiction. In their view, international comity comes into play
whenever a statute is determined to apply extraterritorially according to congressional intent.
Id. at 2917-20. Citing extensive precedent, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); and Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804),Justice Scalia forcefully argues that an act of
Congress "ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." Hartford Fire Ins., 113 S. Ct. at 2919 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118). Thus, forJustice Scalia, the comity analysis is
part of the international law doctrine ofjurisdiction to prescribe, which is a limitation on the
legislative (not the judicial) power of the United States. Id. at 2921 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Justice Scalia's view coincides with prior lower court cases such as Timberlane, 549 F.2d at
608-15; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294-98; and Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 938
n.109 (1984), as well as with the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (1986), which makes the reasonableness analysis and comity "limita-
tions on jurisdiction to prescribe."
217 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 32 (1988).
218 I&
219 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-
Aust., T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, 21 I.L.M. 702.
220 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M.
275.
221 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany Relating to Unilateral Cooperation on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 91.
222 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Coin-
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C. Redressing Foreign Anticompetitive Practices
In 1992, a new jurisdictional controversy arose over a change in
the antitrust enforcement policy announced by the Department ofJus-
tice. 223 The new policy extends extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws to foreign business conduct that hampers U.S. exports
where such activity would have violated U.S. law had it occurred do-
mestically. The Department ofJustice will assert enforcement jurisdic-
tion upon finding the following:
(1) the conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foresee-
able effect on exports of goods or services from the United States;
(2) the conduct involves anticompetitive activities that violate the
U.S. antitrust laws-in most cases, group boycotts, collusive pricing,
and other exclusionary activities; and
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or corpora-
tions engaged in such conduct.2 24
This policy implements the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act 225 which extended the Sherman Act to cover conduct
that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect "on ex-
port trade or export commerce with foreign nations ... 1226 The new
policy supersedes a note227 to the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations that precluded Department of Jus-
tice enforcement against foreign business activity unless the
anticompetitive conduct causes direct harm to consumers in the
United States. 228
This is an important development because it authorizes use of the
U.S. antitrust laws to combat illegal barriers to export competition in
world markets. The new policy may be used against import cartels and
restrictive practices in other countries that exclude U.S. products and
thereby curb competition. 229
The new policy is in accord with the traditional aims of antitrust
law to protect competition in domestic as well as international markets.
It builds upon existing antitrust jurisprudence that establish as clear
mission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1491 [hereinafter U.S.-EC Cooperation Agreement].
223 U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTIGE, Pub. No. 92-117,JusTIcE DEPARTMENT WILL CHALLENGE
FOREIGN RESTRAINTS ON U.S. ExPoRTs UNDER ANTITRUST LAws (1992).
224 Id. at 2-3. For an analysis, see John S. Magney, U.S. Extends Reach of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 1992 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 18; Note, U.S. Department ofJustice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34
H v. INT'L LJ. 192 (1993).
225 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
226 Id.
227 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 142, n. 159, stated that the Justice De-
partment was concerned only about adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S.
consumers,
228 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 142.
229 An example of this is United States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,010 (W.D. Wash.) (consent decree) (involving Japanese purchasers of Alaskan tanner
crabs charged with colluding on prices they would pay for U.S. exports of processed
seafood).
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authority to condemn anticompetitive conduct that limits U.S. exports,
deprives U.S. firms of export opportunities, or has a spillover effect
that restrains competition among U.S. exporters.
This policy should be implemented by understandings with our
trading partners that U.S. enforcement action may be held in abeyance
to give the other concerned nation a reasonable opportunity to' take
action against the conduct. Accordingly, the United States should ne-
gotiate or update bilateral antitrust agreements with its major trading
partners. The new accords, modeled on the U.S.-EC antitrust agree-
ment, should provide for (1) consultation and notification; (2) agree-
ment on factors which may justify an extraterritorial enforcement
action; and (3) a right to request antitrust enforcement action by the
other nation against conduct within its borders that is impeding mar-
ket access or causing extraterritorial anticompetitive effects. If this is
done, competition and market access will be encouraged. This would
be a valuable supplement to trade retaliation under section 301 and an
alternative to protectionist actions under the trade laws.
Thus, traditional "negative" international comity may be supple-
mented by a new "positive comity."23 0 A foreign government would be
induced to enforce antitrust principles to open markets closed to U.S.
exports. Nonetheless, positive comity has distinct limits: No nation
will enforce antitrust laws against its own interests or merely to please
an important trading partner. Thus, positive comity is not a panacea
that will replace extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. In the long
run, the best hope for smoothing the rough edges of extraterritorial
enforcement is to promote further convergence of substantive anti-
trust laws among trading nations and to establish an International An-
titrust Authority as a forum for discussion of antitrust standards,
enforcement, and relief.231 The IAA also could provide a forum for
the resolution of disputes over extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
and foster convergence of action among national antitrust authorities.
VI. Conclusion
There are many correspondences between the antitrust laws and
the laws regulating international trade. Yet, the trade and antitrust
laws often come into conflict. While the trade laws are necessary for
both political and economic reasons, they should not be applied with-
out consideration of their impact on competition and consumer wel-
fare. These traditional antitrust goals retain their validity, and they
serve the cause of American competitiveness better than the protec-
tionism of the trade laws.
230 See James R. Atwood, Positive Comity-Is It A Positive Step?, in INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW & POLICY. ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 79
(Barry Hawk ed. 1993).
231 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
19941
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
There is little evidence that the antitrust laws have contributed to
the American trade deficit or have reduced the international competi-
tiveness of American industries. On the contrary, more competition,
not less, would serve the cause of American competitiveness by open-
ing new export markets and eliminating trade restraints that disadvan-
tage American firms. Accordingly, U.S. policy should be to promote
better antitrust enforcement by other nations as well as harmonization
and consultation so that differing conceptions of the antitrust laws are
not a barrier to trade. In order to minimize such conflicts, the GATT
should adopt a Side Agreement on Competition and Trade.
The extraterritorial application of national antitrust laws is sanc-
tioned by the "effects" jurisdictional test tempered by principles of in-
ternational comity. In order to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction and
law, nations should agree to consult and cooperate to maintain inter-
national competition and free and open national markets. An Interna-
tional Antitrust Authority should be created under the auspices of the
GATT to foster harmonization of national antitrust laws that affect
trade, to resolve disputes, and to promote cooperation on issues relat-
ing to antitrust process and enforcement.
Those who would dilute or weaken the antitrust laws are wrong;
we need more antitrust enforcement, not less, as long as enforcement
takes into account the globalization of markets. Antitrust properly ap-
plied is an alternative to the protectionism of the trade laws.
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